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The European Commission and Parliament have long advocated for substantive and 
substantial changes in national insolvency2 practices, on the premises that disparities 
between national systems: create obstacles to the functioning of an efficient internal 
market; hinder economic growth (or recovery), and impact the availability and cost 
of investments.3 Furthermore, it is generally understood that integration of capital 
markets is seriously jeopardized by lack of sufficient harmonization in insolvency 
law.4 
 
The urgency of such intervention is even more pressing in the aftermath of the 
economic and financial crisis. Excessive levels of leverage in the private sector, the 
worrying magnitude of the phenomenon of non-performing loans (NPLs), and long-
lasting inefficiencies in the market for distressed assets5 all recommend the adoption 
of uniform policies pursuant to article 114 TFEU. 
 
To achieve a (more) level-playing field, empirical studies were commissioned6 with 
the aim of: facilitating the rescue of viable but financially distressed companies; 
                                                 
1 PhD Candidate City University London, LL.M. London School of Economics and Political Science. 
This paper is based on research conducted under the supervision of Professor Sarah Paterson at LSE and 
Professor Jason Chuah at City University London, and supported by a Research Studentship from the City 
University London. I am grateful to Professor Jason Chuah and Professor Katherine Reece-Thomas for 
their comments on earlier drafts. 
2 Depending on the jurisdiction, there are different understandings of the meaning of ‘insolvency law’. 
This paper adopts the English version of the notion. Therefore, the term ‘insolvency law’ is used to refer 
to corporate practice, while the term ‘bankruptcy law’ is relegated to cases dealing to individuals. 
Occasionally, in direct quotations from other authors, this distinction may not be respected. 
3 EC Communication “Towards the Completion of the Banking Union” Com (2015) 587. 
4 “Five Presidents’ Report” on “Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union”, 22 June 2015. 
5 Reference is made to the lack of an efficient distressed debt market, and to the small number of private 
and public asset management companies (AMCs).  
6 Among others, see Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the European Parliament, Harmonisation 
of Insolvency Law at EU Level, PE 419.633; Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the European 
Parliament, ‘Harmonization of Insolvency Law at EU Level with Respect to Opening of Proceedings, 
Claims Filing and Verification and Reorganisation Plans, PE 432.766. 
 Nottingham Insolvency and Business Law e-Journal 
ensuring timely restructuring, and promoting a fresh start for honest, but unfortunate, 
entrepreneurs. Based upon the evidence collected both at European and international 
level,7 the European institutions adopted several soft-law measures, including: 
proposals,8 recommendations,9 communications,10 and action plans.11 
 
The “Insolvency Initiative”12 could be explained as an attempt to redress the 
unsatisfactory levels of harmonization achieved by these non-binding instruments.13 
More remarkable results were obtained where hard-law measures14 were enacted. As 
a result, the Commission has committed itself to submit mandatory approximation 
proposals in several areas of insolvency law by the end of 2016, including opening 
requirements, and directors’ liability for late filing, avoidance actions, creditors’ 
ranking and preventive restructuring frameworks. These are likely to result in a 
legislative instrument, which should be published on 26 October 2016, according to 
the latest available information.15 What is still debated, however, is the form and the 
content of this legislative instrument, and different options are currently source of 
debate.16 
 
If compliance to European insolvency rules is a matter of “when” rather than 
“whether”, a set of ancillary questions arises. It is still to be clarified “what” should 
be harmonized, and “how”. This paper focuses on one aspect of substantive 
harmonization (ranking of creditors). On the basis of the evidence collected during 
an empirical study carried out in Italy, it tries to provide tentative answers to the 
following inquiry: How should we harmonize? 
- 
                                                 
7 IMF Country Reports No. 15/205 (p. 57) and 15/204 (p. 22), July 2015; World Bank Doing Business 
Report 2016, available at: <http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2016> 
[last viewed 30 March 2016]; OECD, ECO/EDR (2014) 6, 23 December 2013. 
8 EP Resolution PT_TA (2011) 0484. 
9 EC Recommendation A New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency COM (2014) 1500. 
10 EC Communication on the Single Market Act II COM (2012) 573; EC Communication A New 
European Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency, COM (2012) 742; EC Entrepreneurship 2020 
Action Plan COM (2012) 795. 
11 Action Plan on Building a Capital Market Union, COM (2015) 468. 
12 Directorate-General Justice & Consumers of the European Commission, Inception Impact Assessment 
Report, 2 March 2016, available at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/insolvency/impact_assessment_en.pdf> [last viewed 30 March 
2016]. 
13 For a Commission’s valuation of the results achieved by means of the 2014 EC Recommendation, see 
the Evaluation of 30/09/2015 attached to the Action Plan on Building a Capital Market Union, COM 
(2015) 468. 
14 See Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 as replaced by June 2017 by Regulation (EU) No. 848/2015 and 
EU Recovery and Resolution Directive No. 2014/59/EU. 
15 Conference on “Convergence of insolvency frameworks within the European Union - the way forward”; 
Brussels, 12 July 2016. 
16 Alternatives include a minimum harmonization Directive, a full harmonization Regulation as well as 
the creation of a self-standing, autonomous but optional set of rules which reminds of recent proposals 
debated in the United States – see Robert K. Rasmussen, ‘Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to 
Corporate Bankruptcy’ (1992/1993) 71 Tex. L. J., 51. For further details, see below note 87. 
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With reference to creditors’ ranking and statutory priorities within insolvency law, 
this question bears no easy answer. On the one hand, Recital 22 of the preamble to 
the recast Insolvency Regulation17 acknowledges that:  
 
“as a result of widely differing substantive laws it is not practical to introduce 
insolvency proceedings with universal scope throughout the Union 
(emphasis added). […] Furthermore, the preferential rights enjoyed by some 
creditors in insolvency proceedings are, in some cases, completely different”. 
On the other, the EU Parliament recognizes that “the current lack of 
harmonization with regard to the ranking of creditors reduces predictability 
of outcomes of judicial proceedings,”18  
 
thus seeming to advocate for the solution dismissed in the recast Regulation. Finally, 
the Commission also acknowledges that some MSs recognize a priority19 status to 
MSMEs’ claims. 
 
This paper reports the empirical evidence (both qualitative and quantitative) 
gathered by the author on the Italian legal treatment of (specific) small 
entrepreneurs20 as claimants. This evidence, alongside the additional considerations 
impacting the Italian insolvency legal system and community, are used to discuss 
the possible alternatives that the EU legislator may adopt in pursuing substantive 
harmonization in this area of law. The paper concludes with the author’s view on the 
optimal approach to substantive harmonization, at least under the current 
circumstances. 
 
This paper is divided into five substantive sections followed by a general conclusion. 
The first section refers to the existing scholarly debate on the opportunity to 
recognize statutory priorities within insolvency law. The second section reports the 
current situation in Italian law - which identifies several priority treatments - and the 
results of the previously mentioned empirical study on the treatment of the claims of 
artisan entrepreneurs.  
 
Having observed that the priority mechanism falls short both of attaining theoretical 
support from the academic community, and achieving the statutory goals that first 
justified its introduction, the third section questions the very foundations advocating 
against its abolition. It analyses the quasi-constitutional nature of the priority status 
of artisan entrepreneurs, and the existence of a business and legal environment 
strongly supportive toward its recognition. This leads the author to conclude the time 
                                                 
17 Regulation (EU) 2015/848. The equivalent in Regulation (EU) 1346/2000 is recital 11. 
18 EP Resolution PT_TA (2011) 0484, sub AB. As a general approach, the European Parliament tends to 
be more prudent than the Commission on the feasibility and extent of any harmonization effort which 
involves substantive provisions of insolvency law.  
19 This paper makes use of the expression of ‘priority’ rather than ‘preferential’ claimants, except in case 
of direct quotations from other authors. The use of the expression ‘preferential claimants’ may overlap 
with description of a claimant requested to return the debtor’s repayments received during the course of 
transactional avoidance but prior to insolvency proceedings being triggered. 
20 ‘Imprenditori Artigiani’ or ‘Artisan Entrepreneurs’. 
 Nottingham Insolvency and Business Law e-Journal 
is not ripe for repealing these statutory priorities from the legislative framework, and 
imposing harmonised solutions at the EU level.  
 
The fourth section proposes a way forward. Assuming that marginal differences 
within insolvency practice do not hinder cooperation in cross-border cases, it 
considers how soft-law, and non-binding EU and international recommendations 
have pushed the Italian legislator to set up a Study Commission,21 and the beneficial 
effects stemming from this approach.22 Given that other MSs23 have undertaken 
similar reform processes since the European Commission and Parliament expressed 
the urgency to adopt a fresh approach to insolvency,24 the Italian “success story” is 
not an isolated case. Further developments should therefore build upon these 
considerations to come up with a solution to this impasse.  
 
The final section describes the limits and shortcomings of the proposed solution, 
while simultaneously highlighting the reasons that support the recommended 
approach. The last section concludes by highlighting the merits and expected 
benefits of the minimum standard harmonization approach. 
 
Statutory Priorities: Quid Curat? 
 
The relative merits of a unified treatment of statutory priorities, alongside the 
reduction in their scope, have been the subject of heated and extensive debate. The 
arguments marshalled by the proponents of this line of thought, are sophisticated, 
complex, and operate at the macro-level. The following paragraphs attempt to 
summarize these debates highlighting their relevance to insolvency practice today, 
while exploring their wider implications for the harmonisation debate. 
                                                 
21 Decree of the Ministry of Justice, 28 January 2015. 
22 At the moment, a proposal for a systemic reform of the Italian insolvency law has been adopted by the 
Council of Ministers [10 February 2016] and is currently being debated in the Parliament 
23 Despite the lack of reply from four MSs (Denmark, which has opted out the Insolvency Regulation and 
its recast, Malta, Cyprus and Ireland), a recent EU Commission’s study, published on 30.9.2015, 
concluded that “a few Member States have undertaken reforms” [Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia, and Spain] (at 1), while in others [Lithuania, the Kingdom of Netherlands, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom] the matter is still being debated. The study concluded that “the main elements of the 
Recommendation are implemented in different ways in Member States” (at 2), and that “several Member 
States consider that they already largely comply with the Recommendation, [while] a significant number 
of those which do not comply have not launched any reforms to date” (at 5) - Directorate-General Justice 
& Consumers of the European Commission, Evaluation of the Implementation of the Commission 
Recommendation of 12.3.2014 on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency, available at: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/insolvency/02_evaluation_insolvency_recommendation_en.pdf> 
[last viewed 29 July 2016]. These conclusions are no longer actually valid because, since the publication 
of this study, several other MSs have implemented reforms in their insolvency framework or, at least, 
opened a debate to possible amendments.  
24 These efforts were not considered sufficient by the EU Commissioner of Justice Věra Jurová who, at a 
recent conference in Brussels (12 July 2016) on the subject of “Convergence of Insolvency Frameworks 
within the European Union - The Way Forward”, argued that “implementation of the Recommendation 
was sketchy, even in those Member States that started reforming their insolvency laws” - speech available 
at: <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/jourova/announcements/speech-commissioner-vera-
jourova-conference-modernising-insolvency-and-restructuring-law-eu_en> [last viewed 29 July 2016]. 
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‘Common pool’/creditors’ wealth maximization theorists25 reject the idea that 
priorities should be recognized in the law, since parties would never agree ex ante 
on their recognition and enforcement.  
 
“Commercial law must establish the appropriate sequence in which creditors 
of a debtor must primarily bear the consequences of his insolvency”.26 
 
These commentators argue that losses “have to be shouldered by parties regardless 
of their relative blameworthiness”.27 They fear that creditors enjoying state-created 
priorities may be incentivised to initiate the liquidation process, or may demand 
similar priority treatments outside insolvency.28 They conclude that  
 
“the protection of non-creditor interests of other victims of corporate decline, 
such as employees, managers, and members of the community, is not the role 
of insolvency law”.29  
 
Their recommendations have been adopted in some jurisdictions.30  
 
Rather surprisingly, also the proponents of opposing communitarian and multi-value 
visions (collectively known as ‘proceduralists’) have reached similar conclusions on 
this particular subject, despite otherwise disagreeing with the above-mentioned 
commentators on the key principles and purposes of insolvency law. Proceduralists 
                                                 
25 Among the most widely acknowledged law and economics scholars are Thomas H. Jackson and 
Douglas G. Baird. They argue that the essential role of insolvency law is to provide collectivized 
machinery for the administration of the debtor’s estate. In their view, this area of law should not be used 
as a proxy to redistribute pre-insolvency property rights, which should be governed by traditional 
commercial rules. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Logics and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Harvard University 
Press 1986); and Douglas G. Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy (6th edn, Foundation Press 2014). See also 
Douglas G. Baird and Thomas H. Jackson, ‘Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse 
Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy’ (1984) 
University of Chicago Law Review 51. 
26 David E. Allan and Ulrich Drobnig, ‘Secured Credit in Commercial Insolvencies: A Comparative 
Analysis’ (1980) 44(4) The Rabel Journal of Comparative and International Private Law 615, at 646. 
27 Vanessa Finch and Sarah Worthington, ‘The Pari Passu Principle and Ranking Restitutionary Claims’ 
in Francis Rose (eds), Restitution and Insolvency (2000, LLP, London), at 7. 
28 Thomas H. Jackson, ‘Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors’ Bargain’ (Apr. 
1982) 91(5) The Yale Law Journal 857, at 904. 
29 Vanessa Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law (2nd ed) (2002, CUP, Cambridge) at 28. 
30 For instance, Austria introduced ‘class-less’ insolvency under the Insolvency Law Reform Act (IRӒG) 
1982 - i.e. no priority treatment recognised - other than for secured creditors. Limited exceptions to this 
general rule result from special fields, such as the Pension and Insurance Law. Germany has abolished all 
categories of priority creditors from its Insolvenzordnung, so it sits in a position similar to the Austrian 
one. However, following the financial crisis and calls for re-introducing the privilege for tax claims, some 
pre-commencement tax claims have been labelled as ‘administration claims’, thus payable in preference 
to other unsecured creditors (§.55 para 4 InsO). In addition, the financial industry managed to make close-
out netting agreements insolvency-proof, thus obtaining a de facto priority treatment over them. As for 
England, after the abolition of the Crown preference by means of the Enterprise Act 2002, priorities are 
restricted to certain sums owing to employees, and certain levies on coal and steel production (sch. 6, para 
15A, Insolvency Act 1986). However, the United Kingdom cannot be defined as a priority-free 
jurisdiction if we consider the effect on pari passu distribution of the “prescribed part” (below note 40). 
For a comprehensive analysis of the ranking of insolvency claims in each of the considered jurisdictions, 
see Dennis Faber et al, Ranking and Priority of Creditors (2016, OUP, Oxford). 
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recognize the paramount role of the pari passu rule.31 They therefore contend that 
rateable distribution among unsecured creditors should remain the default praxis,32 
unless there are good reasons to depart from it.33 The problematic aspect is that 
decades of scholarly debate brought no agreement on how to identify the ‘good 
reasons’ or “persuasive justifications”34 for supporting those statutes, which prefer 
selected creditors to other contributors. 
 
Things do not improve if we analyse the academic contributions, which focused on 
the priority treatment granted to MSMEs. In addition, proposals that recommended 
extending the priority to small claims35 rather than MSMEs have been dismissed, 
since there is no proof that the smaller the loan, the more vulnerable the creditor. 
Finally, empirical studies demonstrated that even insolvency practitioners 
(hereinafter, IPs) do not support the introduction of new priorities, or retention of 
existing ones.36 
 
Alongside the academic debate, international and regional organizations have 
advocated for the reduction or abolition of priority ranking in insolvency. For 
instance, the European Commission has commissioned a recent study to verify, inter 
alia, if different substantive laws in the area force creditors “to assess risk by 
reference to individual countries rather than on a Europe-wide basis”.37 
 
It follows that, for the time being, the only classes of creditors and claims that seem 
to have a stronger case for priority treatment are employees, revenue authorities, tort 
creditors, and environmental clean-up costs. However, even with reference to them, 
                                                 
31 Vanessa Finch observes: “in considering exceptions to pari passu, it is the relative cases for preferring 
the different types of creditors that are at issue” (emphasis as in the original contribution); Finch (above 
note 29) at 627. 
32 Against Look Chan Ho, ‘Goode’s Swan Song to Corporate Insolvency Law’ (2006) 17(6) European 
Business Law Review 1727, according to whom it is misleading to claim the fundamental importance of 
the principle, and then eagerly recognize exceptions to its general application, or to limit its scope to a 
multi-layered understanding.  
33 Paul Heath, ‘Preferential Payments on Bankruptcy and Liquidation in New Zealand: Are They 
Justifiable Exceptions to the Pari Passu Rule?’ (1996) 4 Waikato Law Review 24. By reinstating the 
paramount relevance of the pari passu principle, the author questions even the opportunity of the 
employee preferential status. He observes that “[w]hen assessing whether priority should be given to 
employees, one must also bear in mind the consequences of excluding the wider class of claimant of this 
type and also the danger of according priority to a class of creditor which naturally includes working 
shareholders who function in a management role and who also have a contract of employment”, at 43. 
34 Christopher F. Symes, Statutory Priorities in Corporate Insolvency Law - An Analysis of Preferred 
Creditor Status (2008, Ashgate, Farnham). at 1. 
35 David Milman, ‘Priority Rights in Corporate Insolvency’ in Clarke A. (eds), Current Issues in 
Insolvency Law (1991, Stevens, London), at 78. 
36 According to Professors Andrew Keay and Peter Walton, 97% of practitioners responding to a survey 
in the United Kingdom indicated they would not advocate the introduction of any other new class of 
priority creditors; Andrew Keay and Peter Walton, ‘Preferential Debts: An Empirical Study’ [1999] 
Insolvency Lawyer 112, at 116. 
37 G. McCormack et al., ‘Study on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency’ (2016) at 4, 
available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/insolvency/insolvency_study_2016_final_en.pdf> 
[last viewed 27 July 2016]. 
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there are dissenting opinions,38 with commentators recommending the total abolition 
of priorities in insolvency law, and others arguing for a more multifaceted approach. 
Alan Schwartz, for instance, argued for the adoption of “corrective justice” 
mechanisms that should benefit those creditors (including small trade claimants) 
who are either unaware or unable to react to security. However, he concluded that 
advocating for a change in the priority list, which would favour those creditors, may 
cause more harm than good, and eventually dismissed his own proposal.39  
Jacob S. Ziegel argued that priority treatment is justified only with reference to those 
small trade creditors that do not have enough customers to spread the risk.40 Vanessa 
Finch herself adopted an ambivalent approach on the subject, contending that “the 
English system of borrowing combines with corporate insolvency law’s priority 
regime to discriminate against small companies”,41 and advocating for a move from 
‘lifeline’ towards ‘facilitative’ and ‘risk-distribution’ approaches. 
- 
To summarise, the majority position among commentators is in favour of drastically 
reducing or even abolishing any form of priority. Similar conclusions have been 
advocated by Parliamentary Committees aimed at modernizing insolvency 
practice,42 as well as in the debate for harmonizing the substantive practice in 
insolvency law within the European Union. 
 
Dissenting opinions have not gained wide support in the academic community, and 
lack the persuasiveness of opposing theories. Nevertheless, existing statutes still 
recognize ex post priority treatments to certain creditors.43 It is subsequently about 
                                                 
38 For example, in the European Union, countries like Germany and the United Kingdom do not recognize 
a priority treatment for the collection of taxes.  
39 Alan Schwartz, ‘Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories’ (Jan. 
1981), 10(1) The Journal of Legal Studies 1. 
40 Jacob S. Ziegel, ‘Preferences and Priorities in Insolvency Law: Is There a Solution?’ (1994-1995) 39 
St. Louis University Law Journal 793. The author expressed criticisms towards the 10% solution proposed 
in the U.K. by the Cork’s Committee, not simply for lack of theoretical justification, but also for lack of 
practical benefits. He concluded that, if the proposal had been enforceable at the time of his study, the 
average unsecured creditors’ return would have increased from 5% to 6.7%. In his words, “hardly enough 
to bring joy to a creditor’s heart”, at 804. Nevertheless, a similar mechanism was implemented by means 
of s.176A of the Insolvency Act 1986 thanks to the Insolvency Act 1986 (Prescribed Part) Order 2003. 
This law prescribes that part of the proceeds arising from the realisation of the assets covered by a floating 
charge must be set aside and made available to satisfy unsecured debts. It is calculated as a percentage of 
the value of the company's property subject to a floating charge: namely, 50% of the first £10,000 of net 
floating charge realisations plus 20% of anything thereafter, subject to a cap of £600,000. 
41 Vanessa Finch, ‘Security, Insolvency and Risk: Who Pays the Price?’ (Sept. 1999) 62(5) The Modern 
Law Review 633, at 633. 
42 See Kenneth Cork, Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (Cmnd.8558), 
(London 1982), §.1397: “the elaborate system of priorities […] is the cause of much public 
dissatisfaction, and […] there is a widespread demand for a significant reduction, and even a complete 
elimination, of the categories of debt which are accorded priority in insolvency”. See also Australian Law 
Reform Commission, General Insolvency Inquiry (Report No 45), (Canberra 1998), Chair Ronald W. 
Harmer, §.152: “[a]s far as possible the fundamental principle of insolvency law which requires a rateable 
distribution among unsecured creditors should be reinforced. The existence in the insolvency laws of a 
long list of priority creditors runs contrary to this principle”.  
43 Apart from Italy, other jurisdictions recognize a patchwork of different types of priority and preferential 
claims- examples include the United States [11 U.S.C. §.507(a)], and Belgium. In Canada, different 
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high time the reasons for their recognition and persistence were reviewed and 
reconsidered. 
 
Statutory Priorities: Italia Curat 
 
As mentioned before, no jurisdiction adopts a pure version of the pari passu principle 
of distribution, not even among unsecured creditors. In actual fact, there are 
countries where deviations from the rateable distribution concept become the rule 
rather than the exception. Italy can be listed amongst those countries.  
 
This section analyses the situation of statutory priorities in Italy, and in particular, 
its decision to grant preference to certain MSMEs, alternatively called ‘artisans’ or 
‘artisan entrepreneurs’. It also reports the result of an empirical study aimed at 
verifying whether the legislative choice is capable of achieving the statutory goals. 
This section reinstates the centrality of priorities in the harmonization debate. It 
proves that the original goals that justified the introduction in the Italian statutory 
framework of this priority ranking have not been achieved. In other words, this 
section demonstrates that statutory priorities in general, and the privilege recognized 
to artisans in particular, should be either reformed or abolished. The question that 
will remain unanswered at the end of this section is whether such a change should 
be imposed by the European Union (for instance, by means of a Regulation), or if a 
higher degree of autonomy should be left to the Italian legislator. 
- 
Priority Ranking in Italy 
 
Under the existing Italian insolvency legislation, there are roughly 114 statutory 
exceptions to the principle of rateable distribution among unsecured creditors. This 
without considering rights in rem and the preferential treatment of the expenses 
accrued during the insolvency procedure.44  
 
Commentators have tried to determine the reasons that push some legislations to 
single out so many claimants from the wider category of unsecured creditors, and 
                                                 
priorities are recognized depending on the procedure; and not only by federal, but also by provincial 
statutes. The Russian’s Federation Federal Insolvency Law 2002 also recognizes different priorities 
depending on the business filing for insolvency protection. In addition, the country adopts a tiered system 
for the payment of claimants. Another jurisdiction with a long list of preferential creditors is France, even 
though in the last decade the position of non-preferred creditors has improved. France is one of the very 
few jurisdictions where secured creditors may not satisfy their claims over the secured assets in priority 
to all other claims. Mexico provides special protection for labour claims, while Dutch insolvency 
legislation recognizes a priority status to certain tax claims [art. 21(1) of the Tax Collection Act 1990], 
and salary and social security premiums [art. 3:288(e) of the Civil Code]. Further priorities have also been 
recognized by special statutes. Recent reforms in Poland (2015) have abolished the priority ranking of tax 
claims. Nevertheless, other pre-commencement creditors, such as employees and farmers for supplies of 
products from their own farms, enjoy a priority treatment under the revised legislation. Finally, South 
Korea and Spain recognize priority status to certain claims from MSMEs or natural persons respectively 
for work personally done (i.e. self-employed workers). For a comprehensive analysis of the system of 
priorities in the considered jurisdictions, Faber et al (above note 30). 
44 Available at: <http://fallimento.it/redazione/Privilegi/index.htm> [last viewed 21 July 2016]. 
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from the rateable principle that should guide the distribution of proceeds among 
them. It has been rightly observed that in some countries, priority claims “perform 
the function undertaken by security credits in other systems”.45 Nevertheless, in my 
opinion such an exorbitant and striking deviation from equality in distribution can 
be satisfactorily explained only as the by-product of ongoing political and economic 
pressures. 
 
Irrespective of the majority position mentioned in section I,46 Italian legislation 
recognizes a priority ranking to certain MSME claimants, should one of their debtors 
enter into an insolvency procedure. An ex ante approach, which aims inter alia to 
prevent those companies experiencing financial distress as a consequence of partial 
or non-payment of their invoices. 
 
According to article 2751 bis (5) of the Civil Code,  
 
“[a] general privilege on movable property is granted to claims relating to 
[…] claims of an artisan enterprise [as defined according to the enforceable 
law] and of cooperative societies or institutions for production and work, for 
the compensation of services rendered and the sale of manufactured 
products”.47  
 
This article was introduced by means of law no. 426/1975, to grant additional 
protection to certain creditors (including artisan entrepreneurs) who were considered 
“worthy” of special consideration by the Italian Constitution.48  
 
This rule represents a serious obstacle to the European Commission’s call for closer 
approximation in substantive insolvency practice, since it is likely that substantive 
harmonization at EU level would require repealing the measure from national 
practice. This is a controversial request, especially if the mechanism achieves its 
statutory goals. 
 
To determine its degree of success, it is necessary to observe if (1) the law clearly 
singles out only the creditors worthy of special consideration, and (2) a significantly 
higher and consistent recovery rate is granted to those claimants by means of the 
recognition of this priority status. To answer the first question, an analysis of the 
enforceable law and judicial practice of the Italian courts was undertaken. To answer 
                                                 
45 José M. Garrido, ‘The Distributional Question in Insolvency: Comparative Aspects’ (1995) 4 
International Insolvency Review, 25, at 41. 
46 For a summary see (among others): Ziegel, above note 40; Garrido, ibid; José M. Garrido, ‘No Two 
Snowflakes the Same: The Distributional Question in International Bankruptcies’ (2011) 46 Texas 
International Law Journal, 459. 
47 Susanna Beltramo, The Italian Civil Code and Complementary Legislation (West/Thomson Reuters, 
2012), at 699. The words in brackets were added by law no. 35/2012, and were translated into English 
from Italian by the author of this note. The term “cooperative societies” is better understood as 
“cooperative companies”. 
48 Article 35(1) of the Italian Constitution lays down that “The Republic protects work in all its forms and 
practices”, while article 45(2) specifies that it is up to the law to “safeguard and promote artisanal work”. 
These are the translations in English of the Italian text made by the author of the present note.  
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the second issue, an empirical study was conducted. The following sub-sections 
describe the results of these efforts. 
 
‘Artisans’ in Italian Law and Courts 
 
The profession of ‘artisan’ has always been associated with the making of art (it. 
“artefatto”, lat. arte + factu, made in an artistic fashion) and hand works (it. 
“manufatto”, lat. manu + factu, made by hand). The Italian legislature developed the 
legal notion of ‘artisan’ against this background. Therefore, it comes as no surprise 
that the first legal understanding of ‘artisan’ was closely related to the commonly 
accepted belief of this labourer as a craftsman, who primarily made his living in a 
workshop, relying mainly on manual work. 
 
This is the position adopted by the first “modern”49 statute that mentioned this group 
of workers. Pursuant to law no. 830/1925, the notion of ‘artisan’ was to be used only 
with reference of those self-employed people who exercised their craft in an artistic 
workshop, alone or with the exceptional assistance of a salaried apprentice, and with 
the occasional use of ‘mechanical means’.50 
 
Neither the Civil Code (enacted in 1942) nor the Constitution (enacted in 1948) 
provides a specific definition of ‘artisans’. Only article 2083 of the Civil Code lays 
down that the category of ‘small entrepreneurs’ is formed by  
 
“farmers who personally cultivate the land, artisans, small tradesmen and 
those who engage professionally in an activity organized mainly with their 
own work and that of the members of their families.”51 
 
Despite the lack of any clarification on the meaning of ‘artisan’, their inclusion 
within the category of ‘small entrepreneurs’ is telling. The ratio legis which 
underpins the choice, is to confine the category of artisans to only those 
entrepreneurs who exercise a professional activity prevalently on their own, or with 
the occasional help of members of their families.52 In other words, entrepreneurs not 
substantially dissimilar from salaried workers. A notion that courts clearly had in 
mind when interpreting the scope of the yet-to-be enacted priority in insolvency, as 
it will become evident later in this subsection. 
 
It was not until 1956 that a new definition of ‘artisan’ was provided. The pre-1956 
notion of ‘artisan’ adopted by the legislator was narrow for contemporary standards, 
but less so if we contextualize it within the economic and social situation that the 
                                                 
49 ‘Modern’ refers to legislation enacted after the unification of the different states that formed the Italian 
peninsula, and the settlement of a central government in Rome (17 March 1861).  
50 For an analysis of the preliminary evolution of the legislation on artisans, see F. Cavazzuti, ‘Le Piccole 
Imprese’ in F. Galgano (eds), Trattato di Diritto Commerciale e di Diritto Pubblico dell’Economia (1978, 
Cedam, Padova). 
51 Beltramo (above note 47), at 441. 
52 These advantages originally included the exemption from keeping accounting entries, the registration 
in a special section of the Companies’ House register, and the exemption from insolvency procedures.  
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country experienced in the first half of the 20th century. Mechanical instruments were 
expensive, people tended to live in small villages in the county, and Italy was still in 
the early stages of industrialization. It is therefore safe to assume that a relevant part 
of autonomous, self-employed workers fit in the definitions of ‘artisan’ and ‘small 
entrepreneur’. 
 
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the Second World War, improvements in the 
economic conditions and innovation introduced by the industrialization process 
meant that craftsmen were required to make use of more sophisticated and expensive 
tools to remain competitive in the marketplace. Those who did not embrace 
technological innovations were squeezed out, or relegated to the upper-end of the 
market (i.e. artistic production). 
 
To avert this risk of losing legislative protection and financial benefits, the economic 
community (and the entrepreneurs’ unions) lobbied for adopting a more 
encompassing notion of artisan entrepreneurs. The legislature replied to these calls 
by means of law no. 860/1956, which recognized the industrialization of the artisan 
practice, and provided a definition of artisan entrepreneur valid “for any purpose of 
the law”.53 Entrepreneurs could subsequently still be qualified as ‘artisans’ despite: 
incorporating themselves in some of the existing corporate forms; employing a 
limited number of salaried workers; and making use of more sophisticated mechanic 
tools to produce goods and services. This word became increasingly synonymous 
with “piccola impresa di qualità” (small quality industry).54 
 
In 1975, the statutory priority was introduced (law no. 426/1975). The purpose of 
this statute was to grant additional protection to those entrepreneurs who matched 
the criteria set out in art. 2083 of the Civil Code. From this date onwards, the 
distinction between the two definitions of ‘artisan’ in Italian law brought even more 
remarkable consequences. While the recognition of administrative and financial 
benefits was merely subject to the criteria set out in the special law, insolvency 
priority was recognized only where the creditor could satisfy the criteria laid down 
in both the special law (law no. 860/1956) and the Civil Code (articles 2751 bis (5) 
and 2083). The circumstance that the special law laid down a definition of ‘artisan’ 
valid “for any purpose of the law” had never represented a barrier to this 
interpretation, since jurisprudence55 has proven more sensible in validating the 
intention of the lawmaker. 
                                                 
53 This specification appears tautological, but in reality is extremely important. Law no. 860/1956 was 
mainly enacted to determine the criteria that certain self-employed entrepreneurs should respect in order 
to benefit from tax rebates and other preferential treatments. The specification that the definition is valid 
‘at any effect of the law’ means that, in the legislator’s view, the judiciary should have looked only at the 
statutory criteria set out in the 1956 law to determine if an artisan is a small entrepreneur according to art. 
2083 of the Civil Code.  
54 A. Gambino, ‘Aspetti, Limiti e Prospettive dell’Impresa Artigiana’ (1979) Il Fallimento e le Altre 
Procedure Concorsuali 689, at 699. 
55 While in the US the term is understood as a synonym of ‘philosophy of law’, this paper employs the 
word in the UK fashion, as a synonym of ‘case-law’. 
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This position has been reinstated in several rulings. For instance, back in 2000,56 the 
Supreme Court held that 
 
“the qualification of an individual entrepreneur as an artisan […] requires the 
prominence of the contribution of labour over invested capital, and of 
personal or even manual work, from the owner of the enterprise”.57  
 
Additionally, back in 1998,58 the Supreme Court clarified that 
 
 “law no. 860/1956 […] shall be considered as a natural integration, 
specification and clarification of article 2083- both under a qualitative and 
[…] a quantitative perspective. However, an enterprise cannot be defined as 
‘artisanal’, merely because it matches the quantitative requirements set out 
in articles 1 and 2 of law no. 860/1956”59 (emphasis added). 
 
In 1985, a new statute (law no. 443/1985) replaced the 1956 framework, to further 
extend the definition of ‘artisan’ set out in the special law. However, in a better 
coordination effort with the Civil Code provisions, this act no longer provided the 
artisanal definition “for any purpose of the law”. In reference to the “mechanics”, it 
included the production of semi-finished products among the output of artisanal 
activity, and cancelled the requirement of ‘artistic production’ for a company to be 
considered artisan. Later on, laws no. 133/1997 and 57/2001 conceded that artisans 
could incorporate their workshops and activities in the form of limited liability 
companies, even with more than one shareholders.  
 
However, partly because of the dissatisfaction of the business community, and partly 
out of a need to provide a higher degree of certainty in the interpretation of the law, 
law no. 35/2012 - which amended art. 2751 bis (5) of the Civil Code - specified that 
there is only one definition of ‘artisan’, and that is the definition set out in the special 
law (“as defined according to the enforceable law”).60  
 
In other words, the recent legislator ignored the historic and economic reasons 
behind the choice of having two notions of ‘artisan’, and advocated for the adoption 
of a uniform, unified and rather wide definition based on a mechanic application of 







                                                 
56 Eraldo c. Fall. soc. Ocn - PPI, C. Cass. no. 15785/2000, in Giust. Civ, Mass. 2000, 2598. 
57 This is the translation in English of the Italian text made by the author of the present note. 
58 Ditta Allibardi Salotti c. Fall. Gherardi, C. Cass. no. 456/1998, in Giust. Civ. Mass. 1998, 105. 
59 This is the translation in English of the Italian text made by the author of the present note.  
60 This is the translation in English of the Italian text made by the author of the present note.  
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Law Content 
Law no. 830/1925 Notion of ‘artisan’ as self-employed craftsman; little 
mechanical help. 
Civil Code (royal decree 
no. 262/1942) 
Art. 2083: ‘artisans’ are small entrepreneurs, if 
personal work prevails over the work of the members 
of their families and over capital. 
Constitution (1947/1948) No definition of ‘artisan’. 
Law no. 860/1956 ‘Artisan’ defined for any purpose of the law as a self-
employed entrepreneur or a company, which may 
produce goods and provide service while employing 
salaried workers and making use of mechanical 
tools. 
Law no. 426/1975 Introduction of art. 2751 bis in the Civil Code. 
‘Artisans’ (as defined by art. 2083 c.c.) are 
recognized a priority ranking among unsecured 
creditors in insolvency proceedings. 
Law no. 443/1985 ‘Artisans’ no longer defined for any purpose of the 
law, but definition is anchored to loose quantitative 
criteria and procedural requirements. 
Laws no. 133/1997 and 
no. 57/2001 
‘Artisans’ could enjoy the benefits of limited 
liability. 
Law no. 35/2012 Amendment to art. 2751 bis (5) of the Civil Code: to 
identify artisans, it is necessary and sufficient to look 
at the criteria set out in the special legislation (e.g. 
law no. 443/1985 as subsequently amended).  
To summarise: 
 Until the enactment of the Civil Code, Italy only had a notion of artisan 
enterprise based on qualitative and quite stringent (for modern standards) 
quantitative criteria; 
 The Civil Code and law no. 860/1956 introduced two autonomous notions 
of artisans, which were used in different contexts and for achieving separate 
goals. If an entrepreneur matched the requirements set out in the special 
law, he/she could claim the administrative and fiscal benefits recognized by 
its mean. Alternatively, if the requirements set out in the Civil Code were 
met, he/she could also claim the benefits reserved for small entrepreneurs; 
 Law no. 426/1975 introduced the special treatment for those artisan 
entrepreneurs in insolvency, but only should those entrepreneurs match 
both the criteria set out in the Civil Code (art. 2083) and in the special law; 
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 Further amendments of the special notion of ‘artisan’ did not invalidate the 
widely accepted interpretation that priority in insolvency could be 
recognized only to those enterprises that matched the criteria set out both 
in the Civil Code and in the special legislation, to the general dissatisfaction 
of MSMEs (who advocated for relying only on the criteria set out in the 
special legislation, without reference to the qualitative requirements set out 
in art. 2083); 
 The most recent legislator (law no. 35/2012) decided to unify those notions, 
and rely on a purely quantitative notion - the solution for which MSMEs 
had been advocating. Whilst the lower courts seem to have accepted the 
new legislative will61, the matter still has to be brought in front of the 




It is undeniable that quantitative criteria and procedural requirements have the merit 
to identify ‘artisan entrepreneurs’ ex ante, with a sufficient degree of certainty. 
However, it is equally indisputable that the category of creditors who fall within the 
revised legislative definition largely exceeds the purposes for which the priority 
ranking was introduced (and justified) back in 1975.  
 
In addition, there is potential for abusive treatment in cross-border cases, since one 
of the requirements for the recognition of priority status is the company being listed 
in a separate section of the companies’ register. What if a company incorporated in 
another EU MS matches all the other substantive criteria, without being incorporated 
in Italy?62 
                                                 
61 E. s.r.l. in liquid., Tribunale Ravenna 23 Dec. 2014, in Redazione Giuffrè 2014; equally Trib. Milano 
14 June 2013 (unreported), available at: <http://www.istitutoproform.org/fall/?p=34> [last viewed 25 July 
2016]. 
62 This circumstance is in itself incompatible with freedom of establishment as provided by art. 49-52 
TFEU. 
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To add a further degree of complexity, with the exception of some isolated cases63 
(backed by some commentators),64 the Supreme Court65 and the majority of lower 
courts66 have been consistent in ruling that only those ‘artisan enterprises’ which 
possess both the qualitative criteria set out in the Civil Code (article 2083) and the 
quantitative criteria set out in the special legislation (law no. 443/1985) are entitled 
to the priority ranking.67 It is still too early to determine if the 2012 amendment 
would result in a change of this consolidated jurisprudence. 
 
This sub-section proved the existence of a significant mismatch between the 
creditors who (in the 1975 legislator’s mind) should have benefitted from the priority 
ranking, and those who are actually entitled to priority under current legislation. 
 
The legislative choice to adopt a uniform notion of ‘artisan’ based on quantitative 
rather than qualitative criteria may work properly if the main concern is ‘certainty’ 
in the application of the law. However, it proves wanting for insolvency law 
purposes, where attention should be paid to other elements. It follows that the 
priority scheme as currently framed is a relatively blunt instrument, unable to carve 
out non-adjusting creditors, i.e. those who are unable to adjust the explicit or implicit 
lending terms to take into account the fact that the borrower has granted security on 




                                                 
63 Decreto Tribunale Milano 14 June 2013, Eredi di Frigerio Angelo di Leonardo Frigerio & C. S.n.c. c. 
Fall. Immobiliare Costruzioni IM.CO. S.p.a. (unreported), available at: 
<http://www.ilcaso.it/giurisprudenza/archivio/9874.pdf> [last viewed 14 June 2016]; App. Torino, 30 
April 1986, in Fall., 1987, 817; Eraldo c. Fall. soc. Ocn - PPl, C. Cass. no. 15785/2000 in Giust. Civ. 
Mass., 2000, 2598; and Ditta Allibardi Salotti c. Fall. Gherardi, C. Cass. no. 456/1998, in Fall., 1986, 
915. 
64 G. Bozza and G. Schiavon, L’Accertamento dei Crediti nel Fallimento e le Cause di Prelazione (1992, 
Giuffré, Milano), at 928. 
65 See among others F.lli Zanchetta S.n.c. c. S.V., C. Cass. no. 7116/2015, in Diritto & Giustizia, 10 April 
2015; Soc. Battocchia Termo c. Fall. soc. Edil 200, C. Cass. SS.UU. no. 5685/2015, in Giust. Civ. Mass. 
2015; Annapiù Tricot di Carrer Anna Maria & C. S.n.c. c. Fallimento Harold S.r.l., C. Cass. no. 
11024/2013 (unreported). Similar conclusions were reached in older judgments, such as Fall. Deiani e 
altro c. Leonesio, C. Cass. no. 11963/1990, in Giur It., 1991, I(1), 1014; and Soc. De Benedetti c. Fall. 
soc. Rossi, C. Cass. no. 7366/1998, in Giust. Civ. Mass. 1998, 1603. Unfortunately, all these judgments 
refer to the law applicable before the 2012 amendments. In fact, despite some of them being given after 
the enforcement of the modifications, the Supreme Court clarified that the new version of art. 2751 bis 
(5) does not apply to insolvency procedures filed before 2012 (see Cass. SS.UU. no. 5685/2015, cited 
above in this note). As such, the Supreme Court has not yet had the opportunity to clarify whether the 
2012 amendments modified the commonly accepted criteria for determining whether a company is an 
‘artisan’ or not. 
66 Among others, see Trib. Udine, 11 June 1982 and 22 August 1983, in Giur. Comm., 1984, II, 49; and 
Trib. Genova, 4 August 1982, Banca Borsa Titoli di Credito, 1983, II, 567. 
67 In other words, the prevailing opinion in the judiciary is that – for the purposes of art. 2751 bis (5) of 
the Civil Code - ‘artisans’ should be small entrepreneurs whose work (and that of the members of their 
family) prevails over the work of any other employee and on the assets (as per art. 2083 of the Civil 
Code). Additionally, their company should meet the criteria set out in law no. 443/1985. 
68 Finch, above note 41, at 652. 
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The Empirical Study  
 
To determine the efficiency of the priority mechanism, a survey was undertaken on 
1,193 liquidation procedures closed in the years 2013 and 2014 in seven districts 
within four Italian regions. 
 
This study is entirely replicable. It is based upon reports and legal documents 
uploaded by IPs and judges on a privately-owned web platform called Fall.co. The 
use of this system - which has since been replaced by a state-owned, purposefully 
developed platform - was voluntary, even though those courts that relied on it, 
strongly encouraged IPs and civil servants to make use of it.  
 
Apart from those district courts that did not rely on this informatics platform - and 
could not therefore be considered for the purposes of this study - the researcher did 
not include large districts (such as Bologna, Milan or Venice) in his sample. This 
was due to the number of procedures to analyse (which would have been 
overwhelming for a study carried out by a single person), and because the evidence 
otherwise obtained would have largely prevailed in number over that gathered from 
the other circuits. Geographical variety has been preferred to the analysis of a larger 
number of cases in order to counteract possible biases arising from local practices. 
 
The research covers almost two years from proceedings closed in 2013 and up to 
July 2014. It was considered (and would have been preferable) to gather data from 
proceedings closed less recently, and compare the recent with the older findings. 
Unfortunately, the possibility was dismissed due to the impossibility of gathering 
such evidence. 
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No. of liquidation procedures analysed: 1,193 
 
 
a) Closed for reasons unrelated with payment of 
creditors 
54 (4.52%) 
b) Closed for distribution of assets/money 450 (37.72%) 
(of whom)   
 within 730 days (2 years) 11 2.44% 
 between 730 and 1,825 days (2 to 5 years) 163 36.22% 
 over 1,825 days (> 5 years) 276 61.34% 
c) Closed for lack of assets/money  303 (25.39%) 
(of whom)   
 within 730 days (2 years) 101 33.33% 
 between 730 and 1,825 days (2 to 5 years) 136 44.88% 
 over 1,825 days (> 5 years) 66 21.68% 
d) Closed for full payment of creditors 4 (0.33%) 
e) Unable to establish the reasons 382 (32.04%) 
  





 without artisan enterprises or similar creditors 475 (62.74%) 
 with artisan enterprises or similar creditors 282 (37.26%) 
 
Average recovery rate: 33.05% 
  
 full payment 84 (29.78%) 
 within 730 days (2 years) 0  
 between 730 and 1,825 days (2 to 
5 years) 
20 23.8% 
 over 1,825 days (> 5 years) 64 76.2% 
 no payment 169 (59.92%) 
 within 730 days (2 years) 19 11.24% 
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 between 730 and 1,825 days (2 to 
5 years) 
84 49.7% 
 over 1,825 days (> 5 years) 66 39.06% 
 distr. rate between 0% and 50% 21 (7.44%) 
 distr. rate above 50% 8 (2.86%) 
 
At first glance, the results seem to vouch for the effectiveness of priority treatment. 
The experienced simple average recovery rate (‘mean’ value) for artisan enterprises 
was 33.05%.69 In almost one out of three cases (29.78%), artisans received the full 
reimbursement of their claims from the insolvent estate. These values alone are 
remarkably higher than others experienced by MSMEs in other countries, where they 
are classified as unsecured creditors. In actual facts, they are similar to the recovery 
rate experienced by secured creditors in some EU MSs.70 
 
Furthermore, existing law extends the priority status to the interests that accrued 
before the debtor filed the insolvency petition71 and, should no payment or partial 
payment be made, Italian tax law recognizes the fiscal benefits to the creditor. 
 
A closer analysis of the collected data, however, highlights mixed results. The most 
frequently occurring ‘modal’ values were either 0% (nihil) or 100% (integral) 
recovery, depending on the year and the district considered. In almost 2 out of 3 
cases (59.92%), artisans received no payment at all at the end of the proceedings. 
Fiscal benefits are recognised only when the liquidation procedure has closed, and it 
is clear that no payment will be made for the benefit of the claimants. Taxes, such as 
income tax and VAT, need to be paid upfront - when the invoice is issued. As such, 
it is only after the end of the liquidation procedure (potentially lasting several years), 
that the creditor can claim back the amount paid. Furthermore, this rebate is 
recognized not in cash, but as a deduction from future duties. 
                                                 
69 Despite being subject to great variability, this value is remarkable, especially if compared to the results 
of other studies (despite them being focused on the recovery rate of secured creditors).On the one hand, 
according to a recent study commissioned by the Bank of Italy among financial institutions, the average 
recovery rate in liquidation procedures in 2014 was 28%. However, this value refers mainly to secured 
claims - see Luisa Carpinelli et al., ‘The Management of Nonperforming Loans: a Survey Among the 
Main Italian Banks’ (2016) 311 Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Banca d’Italia, - also available at: 
<https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/qef/2016-0311/QEF_311_16_ENG.pdf?language_id=1> 
[last viewed 29 July 2016].On the other, according to a World Bank Report on Italian creditors, secured 
creditors can count on a recovery rate of 63.1 cent per dollar - see “World Bank: 2015 Doing Business 
Report - Going Beyond Efficiency”, available at: 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/resolving-insolvency#close> [last viewed 29 July 
2016] 
70 According to the World Bank Doing Business Report 2015 mentioned above, secured creditors in 
Croatia may expect a recovery rate of 30.5%, of 32.7% in Romania, and of 34.9% in Greece. These values 
are only fractionally higher than the average recovery rate of artisans in Italy who, despite the statutory 
priority, are still listed among unsecured creditors (and therefore are paid only in subordination to secured 
creditors).   
71 With a limit of up to 2 years - see art. 2749 of the Civil Code.  
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Length of procedures emerged as another problematic aspect. Evidence proves that 
the longer the duration of the procedure, the higher the return to the claimants. Only 
2.44% of the cases analysed in the sample resulted in a partial or full distribution of 
proceeds within 2 years. The most recent available data shows (arguably because of 
the amendments introduced in August 2015)72 that the average duration for formal73 
insolvency procedures concluded in 2015 fell to 7 years and 5 months,74 down 8 
months from 2014. These figures, however, refer to all insolvency proceedings 
(including rescue ones, which were not considered for the purposes of this study), 
and do highlight a wide geographical variance.75 Additionally, unlike this study, 
these figures also do not make the vital distinction between the duration of 
insolvency proceeding leading to a substantial distribution to creditors, from those 
resulting in no distribution due to lack of available assets. 
 
Qualitative interviews with entrepreneurs and practitioners, as well as case analysis 
and literature review, evidences further matters of concern. Artisan entrepreneurs 
have proven to rely more on quasi-immediate fiscal benefits (such as tax 
deductibility for write-offs) over recovery rates, since the latter are usually paid only 
at the conclusion of lengthy76 and expensive77 formal or hybrid insolvency 
proceedings. 
 
To conclude, while the recovery rate of artisan entrepreneurs is comparably high, 
this value is far from consistent so artisans do not rely on it. Furthermore, the length 
of time required for any distribution to take place, as well as the existing tax policies, 
do little to prevent creditors falling into these same financial difficulties ultimately 
created by their defaulting debtors. 
                                                 
72 Law Decree No. 83/2015 published in Gazzetta Ufficiale No. 147 of 27 June 2015, turned into Law 
No. 132/2015 published in Gazzetta Ufficiale No. 192 of 20 August 2015. 
73 For the purpose of this abstract, the notion of “formal” insolvency proceedings also includes “hybrid” 
preventive restructuring procedures as defined in European Commission, Directorate-General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs, ‘The Economic Impact of Rescue and Recovery Frameworks’, Ref. 
Ares(2015)3579794, 31 August 2015. 
74 Available at: <https://know.cerved.com/en/study-and-analysis/duration-bankruptcy-proceedings-
concluded-2015-italy#> [last viewed 16 June 2016]. 
75 In the most ‘efficient’ circuits, insolvency procedures last on average between 3 and 4 years, while the 
slowest ones may take on average 15 years. 
76 According to a recent study from the Bank of Italy (available at: 
<https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/note-stabilita/2015-0002/index.html>, [last viewed 30 March 
2016]), the average duration of a liquidation proceeding in Italy is more than 6 years, while the average 
length for a foreclosure proceeding exceeds 4 years. Other studies show and even bleaker picture, and 
conclude that in 2015 the average duration of Italian insolvency proceedings (formal and hybrid) was 7 
years 5 months, while back in 2014 the average duration was in the region of 8 years and a half. See: 
<https://know.cerved.com/en/study-and-analysis/duration-bankruptcy-proceedings-concluded-2015-
italy#>, [last viewed 16 June 2016]. 
77 According to Italian insolvency law (Royal Decree No. 267/1942), creditors do not need legal assistance 
either to submit their claims or throughout the insolvency procedure. However, a lack of adequate 
expertise, as well as ongoing habits, results in entrepreneurs – especially running small and medium-sized 
enterprises – being heavily reliant on the expertise of insolvency lawyers and practitioners for conducting 
proceedings..   
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These dismal results negatively affect the efficiency and health of the credit system. 
According to the most recent data, Italian banks have over 350 billion euros in bad 
loans (18.1% of total loans), around 200 billion of these being categorised as NPLs.78 
Loans of the lowest category (“sofferenze”) amount to about 154 billion euros, which 
in turn represent 29.4% of all bank exposures with enterprises. 
- 
This section clarified that, back in 1975, certain craftsmen called ‘artisans’ were 
granted - for policy reason - a priority ranking among unsecured creditors, to give 
them a better chance of surviving the distress experienced by one or more of their 
debtors. The main reason underlying this decision was to grant an additional layer 
of protection in insolvency to those small entrepreneurs that were not substantially 
dissimilar to salaried workers. Accordingly, as the jurisprudence highlighted, until 
recently it was required that the entrepreneur generated his income mainly with his 
personal work, or with that of the members of his family. 
 
While the judiciary tried to interpret the statutory priority in accordance with its 
policy goals (at least to a certain extent), successive amendments of the existing 
legislation broadened the scope of the exception. As a result, the statutory evolution 
of the notion of ‘artisan’ is inconsistent with the interpretation of the judiciary. 
Indeed, in combination with current insolvency practices, it has ultimately 
contributed to thwarting the effectiveness of the measure. 
 
This is a fertile terrain for reform. But should this reform be imposed by the 
European Union, or simply facilitated? The following sections debate this issue. 
 
Why Artisans Are (Still) Prioritized: Considerations for Not Repealing 
Statutory Priorities in Italy 
 
The results of the empirical study shed more light on the inadequacy of the current 
priority mechanism adopted by Italian insolvency law, in particular with reference 
to artisan entrepreneurs. As such, it is no surprise that various scholars, as well as 
international and regional organizations, have long advocated for the reduction or 
abolition of statutory priority ranking in insolvency due to their inefficiency. 
However, recent reforms and Parliamentary debates, would demonstrate there is 
little political appetite for abolishing or curtailing these priorities in insolvency law. 
This section tries to explain the possible reasons, at least with reference to the 
priority treatment of artisans, and subsequently hints at why full harmonization of 
insolvency practice at the EU level might be a bad idea. 
- 
The first aspect to be investigated is the relation between statutory laws enacted by 
the Parliament and Italy’s fundamental law, the Constitution. 
                                                 
78 John Willcock, ‘First the Brexit Vote - now the Italian Banks’ (July 2016) 198 Global Turnaround, at 
6; Banca d’Italia, Financial Stability Report 1/2016 (29 April 2016) - available at: 
<https://www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/rapporto-stabilita/2016-1/en-FSR-1-
2016.pdf?language_id=1> [last viewed 29 July 2016]. 
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While the priority ranking in insolvency for artisans was introduced only by means 
of law no. 426/1975, the Italian Constitution mentions artisans in two different 
articles (even if in one case only indirectly). These mentions are particularly 
surprising given it is a relatively short piece of legislation with only 139 articles, 
which are very broad in scope.  
 
Article 35(1) clarifies that “The Republic protects work in all its forms and 
practices”. Artisanal practice is included in this notion of “work”, as clarified by the 
case law.79 Furthermore, pursuant to article 45(2) “The Law safeguards and 
promotes artisanal work” (emphasis added).80 
 
These articles are not sufficient to claim that the statutory priority for artisan 
entrepreneurs enjoys a “constitutional” protection. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that 
the legislation which has introduced this mechanism into the Civil Code has aimed 
to transplant mandate specified by article 45(2) of the Constitution. 
Furthermore, the choice to introduce this priority ranking by means of an amendment 
to the existing Civil Code should not be underestimated. The Civil Code, despite its 
lack of hierarchical prominence over other statutes, is remarkably more prestigious 
than any other statutory mechanism. 
 
Finally, the Constitutional Court has proven very resilient in allowing the legislator 
to amend the “rights” of Italian citizens. For instance, it took the government three 
attempts81 to establish a “solidarity contribution” on retirement benefits exceeding 
the threshold of € 90,000 per month. If the Constitutional Court considered that the 
priority ranking of artisan entrepreneurs is needed to safeguard and promote artisanal 
work, its repeal might prove problematic. In truth, this is a remote and unlikely 
hypothesis, but there are precedents and a legal basis for it being advocated in a 
courtroom. 
 
The second aspect to be considered is the relevance role that micro-enterprises and, 
in particular, artisan enterprises play in the current economy. In the case of artisans, 
there are also political considerations closely linked to sustaining the economic 
relevance of this category of entrepreneur. 
                                                 
79 Adriano Patti, I Privilegi (2003, Giuffré, Milano), at 201. The belief that priority treatments granted by 
means of art. 2751 bis of the Civil Code represent the enforcement of the constitutional principle 
according to which ‘work in every forms and practices’ needs to be protected, is supported by the 
prevailing jurisprudence (see the judgment no. 1/2000 rendered by the Constitutional Court). 
80 This is the translation in English of the Italian text made by the author of the present note. Article 45 in 
particular entrusts the legislator to define the statutory measures to not only protect, but also promote the 
development of artisanal work. This attention to this typology of enterprise has, for some authors, resulted 
in “iper-regulation” – P.F. Lotito, ‘Commentary to Art. 35 of the Italian Constitution’ in R. Bifulco et al 
(eds), La Costituzione Italiana (2007, Strenna Utet, Milano) at 927. 
81 The first attempt (law no. 111/2011) was quashed by the ruling no. 116/2013 in the case B.G. et al c. 
Inps et al. (Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 2013, 3, 1886). The second attempt (art. 1(1), law no. 
214/2011) was successfully challenged in C.G. et al c. Pres. Cons., C. Cost, no. 70/2015, in Foro 
Amministrativo 2015, 4, 1004.  
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According to the most recent available data82 (that refer to the situation as per 31 
December 2013), micro-enterprises (i.e. with less than 10 people employed) 
represent 95.3% of active enterprises, 47.45% of number of persons employed, and 
constitute 25.85% of total turnover generated by companies in the country. Among 
these micro-enterprises, there are 2.4 million employing only one person, which 
contribute a third of the global turnover generated by this class. 
 
Small and medium enterprises (i.e. 10-249 people employed) provide work to 
32.88% of the total labour force and account for 43.18% to turnover, while larger 
enterprises (i.e. 250+ employees) grant a workplace to 19.7% of the workforce, and 












0-9 4,094,444 95.27 7,518,178 47.45 762,497 25.85 
10-19 127,998 2.97 1,679,039 10.6 316,186 10.72 
20-49 50,760 1.19 1,510,447 9.53 343,315 11.64 
Total (1) 4,273,202 99.43 10,707,664 67.58 1,421,998 48.21 
50-249 20,897 0.49 2,021,059 12.75 614,279 20.82 
250+ 3,383 0.08 3,116,677 19.67 913,555 30.97 
Total 
(1+2) 
4,297,482 100 15,845,400 100 2,949,832 100 
 
In summation, companies up to 49 employees - which are, for the largest part, 
potentially eligible under current legislation to be classified as “artisan enterprises” 
- represent 99.43% of Italian companies, despite employing “only” 67.58% of the 
workforce and contributing less than half of global business turnover. 
 
These represent quite remarkable numbers, while not dissimilar to those experienced 
in other jurisdictions.83 Nevertheless, it is the role that these companies play in the 
society and their constitutional prominence, which push the Italian legislator to 
continue to recognize their priority within insolvency law. 
- 
Given the potential issues posed by uncontrolled variables, it is difficult to accept 
the results of this study at face value. This is because is not possible to measure every 
variable capable of hindering a change in the current practice. However, the results 
                                                 
82 Report on the Structure and Competitiveness of the Industrial and Services Enterprises, available at: 
<http://www.istat.it/en/archive/175960> [last viewed 20 July 2016]. 
83 According to the Department for Business, Innovation & Skills’ study on Business Population 
Estimates for the UK and Regions 2015, small businesses accounted for 99.3% of all private sector 
businesses at the start of 2015, and 99.9% were small or medium sized (MSMEs). Available at: 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/467443/bpe_2015_stati
stical_release.pdf> [last viewed 20 July 2016]. Similar data was collected by EUROSTAT with reference 
to other countries within the European Union - available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/structural-
business-statistics/structural-business-statistics/sme> [last viewed: 20 July 2016]. 
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should not be uncritically rejected merely for a lack of precise correspondence with 
the law-in-action. 
 
While legislative reform within “certain areas of insolvency law where 
harmonization is worthwhile and achievable”84 can be welcomed, any proposal 
should also carefully consider shortcomings and limitations in order not to foster 
over-reaching expectations.85 A European, top-down Regulation may fall short of 
achieving this balance. 
 
The Commission and the Directorate-General for Justice launched a consultation on 
the beast approaches to improve the status quo.86 Respondents highlighted at least 
three possible options,87 with the preferred choice varying depending on the main 
respondent group.88 It was not surprising to observe that MSs and banks advocated 
for a more cautious approach, arguing that reform of national insolvency frameworks 
should be a more long-term project. 
 
The evidence collected in this study, along with the observations in the following 
sections, suggest that full harmonization of certain substantive provisions (e.g. 
ranking of creditors) may do more harm than good, especially if conceived in a 
vacuum. The same Directorate-General Justice & Consumers of the European 
Commission recognizes that full harmonization 
 
 “is ambitious given the interplay with other national policy objectives, 
values and national traditions. If feasible (emphasis added), it would 
inevitably be a project for the long term”.89 
 
While the time may not be ripe for full harmonization of insolvency practices (and 
creditors’ ranking systems), a minimum harmonization Directive may represent an 
appropriate instrument to foster the establishment of an efficient internal market, and 
adequately incentivize national legislators to level out their insolvency systems. 
                                                 
84 EP Resolution PT_TA (2011) 0484, sub C. 
85 In particular, it might prove challenging to conceive of a harmonized insolvency system capable of, 
inter alia, “maximiz[ing] the total value [of the distressed firm] to creditors, employees, owners and the 
economy as a whole” – EC COM(2014) 1500, sub (1). 
86 Green Paper on a Capital Market Union COM (2015) 63, in particular question 29. 
87 Directorate-General Justice & Consumers of the European Commission, Inception Impact Assessment, 
available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/insolvency/impact_assessment_en.pdf> [last viewed 
29 July 2016], at 6. As mentioned above in note 16, options include: (a) a minimum harmonisation 
Directive focusing on specific aspects of insolvency; (b) a full harmonization instrument covering the 
main insolvency procedures in detail, and (c) a 29th regime sitting alongside national insolvency regimes 
into which creditors could opt. 
88 Respondents in favour of option (a) included: banks, pension funds and other financial intermediaries; 
MSs. Respondents in favour of option (b) included: central banks and capital markets regulators, as well 
as labour unions. Meanwhile option (c) was advocated by one central bank. Business associations showed 
more divided opinions both on the impact of differing national insolvency regimes and on the form of 
possible actions to tackle those differences, while representatives of the MSMEs appreciates 
improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of IPs and the courts. Feedback Statement on the Green 
Paper “Building a Capital Markets Union” (Question 29), SWD(2015) 184 final, at 59. 
89 Directorate-General Justice & Consumers of the European Commission, above note 87, at 6. 
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The following section explains why a Directive may be preferable to a 29th elective 
insolvency regime, and explores in greater details the possible content of this 
legislative instrument, and the benefits expected by its implementation. 
 
A Way Forward 
 
While the previous section outlined the reasons against the implementation of a full 
harmonization Regulation, the EU legislator may well opt for the enactment of a 
non-binding substantive set of rules, following the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency pattern. This section, however, demonstrates why it is 
preferable, at least at this stage, for the EU legislator not to depart from the well-
established practice of the incremental and minimum harmonization approach. 
 
On the one hand, establishing a 29th comprehensive and eligible insolvency regime 
would require extensive and lengthy work from the European administrative bodies, 
with the involvement of experts from several jurisdictions. Moreover, given its 
elective nature, it may also result in scarce application unless MSs can incentivize 
their businesses to opt-in.90 Furthermore, during the consultation of the Green Paper 
“Building a Capital Markets Union” only one respondent advocated this method. 
Finally, should the MS fail to implement the mechanism in the time prescribed, the 
provision could end up not be used in cases between private parties (incidental 
horizontal effects).91 
 
On the other, despite the unsatisfactory remarks of the EU Commissioner for 
Justice,92 recent regional and international93 documents have succeeded in putting 
pressure on the Italian government to set up a study commission94 aimed at 
conceiving a systemic reform of its substantive insolvency law. Similar results have 
been achieved in other MSs. This proves that soft-law measures - or, at least, 
                                                 
90 An alternative solution may consist in the automatic application of the system unless a company opts 
out. However, such a solution would hardly be accepted by MSs, and would impinge the rights of existing 
creditors.   
91 This doctrine was created in cases such as CIA Security International SA v Signalson SA (Case C-
194/94) [1996] ECR I-2201, and Unilever Italia SpA v Central Food SpA (Case C-443/98) [2000] ECR 
I-7535, where the ECJ - while not departing from the Marshall/Dori rulings - concluded that Directives 
can, even in actions between private parties, exclude the enforcement of inconsistent national law. 
92 Above note 24. 
93 The Commission’s paperwork expressly refers to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency (1997), its Guide to Enactment and Interpretation (2013), as well as to the UNCITRAL 
Legislative Guides on Insolvency Law (2004, 2010 and 2013).  
94 The Commission was set up by means of a Decree of the Ministry of Justice, dated 28 January 2015. It 
is commonly known as “Rordorf Commission” by the name of its president, a judge in the Italian Supreme 
Court. The official name of the Commission is “Commissione per elaborare propote di interventi di 
riforma, ricognizione e riordino della disciplina delle procedure concorsuali”. More details available at: 
<http://www.fallimentiesocieta.it/sites/default/files/Riforma_DirFall.pdf> [last viewed 26 July 2016]. 
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measures binding merely with reference to their purposes, such as Directives - may 
equally well promote substantive changes within the current legislation.95 
 
This section consequently advocates for complimenting the 2014 Recommendation 
with a draft Directive. It suggests the inclusion of specific goals in its recital, and it 
analyses the supportive role that the CJEU could play to promote reform in Italy 
(and, similarly, in other MSs). It also describes how Italian legislation should (and 
could) change to meet the recommended aims.  
- 
The “Carrot”: Soft-Law Measures 
 
Italian authorities have undertaken successive reforms of the insolvency and 
enforcement framework in recent years.96 What has always been lacking in these 
attempts is a “global view”: there have only been piecemeal and fragmentary 
amendments to the existing statutory framework, which dates back to the Second 
World War.97 However, these reforms have primarily been driven by non-binding 
recommendations. 
 
More recently however, on 10th February 2016 the Council of Ministers adopted a 
draft statutory instrument to reform the Italian insolvency framework from the 
grounds up. A detailed analysis of the content of this proposal, which has already 
been amended during the Parliamentary debate in the Justice Commission,98 would 
fall outside the scope of this study. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to say that this 
proposal, if enacted, would represent the first, global and systemic attempt to reform 
of insolvency law since the enactment of the current legislation. 
 
It is proper to qualify this as merely a proposal for delegated legislation. Only once 
the draft instrument is approved by the Parliament, and published in the Official 
Gazette, the Government and the Ministry of Justice will have the authority to amend 
the current legislation. The Government will then have another twelve months to 
issue one or more law decrees, which have to conform to the requirements and 
directions set out in the statutory instrument passed by the Parliament. It is their 
enactment that will determine a change in the applicable law. 
                                                 
95 According to the report attached to the draft legislation proposal currently debated in the Parliament, 
the “zero option” - that is leaving things as they are, without amending the existing legislation - is 
unfeasible, due to the “strong recommendations” made at the EU and international level. 
96 For a summary, see José Garrido, IMF Working Paper on Insolvency and Enforcement Reforms in Italy, 
WP/16/134, at 7 - available at: <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/wp16134.pdf> [last 
viewed 29 July 2016]. The Author notes that “[t]he frequent and sudden modifications of the law have, 
however, come at a cost of undermining legal certainty”, at 8.  
97 Royal Decree no. 262/1942 and Civil Code (1942).  
98 At the moment, there are two versions of the original proposal for delegated legislation: (i) (C-3671 bis 
- available at: <http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg17/lavori/stampati/pdf/17PDL0041360.pdf> [last viewed 
26 July 2016]) which deals with the main body of the reform; (ii) (C-3671 ter - available at: 
<http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg17/lavori/stampati/pdf/17PDL0041370.pdf> [last viewed 26 July 2017]) 
which amends the discipline of a rescue procedure for large corporations only. 
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However, the delegation is binding only with reference to the content of the reform. 
In other words, the Government is not forced to issues those law decrees, and the 
delegation may expire without any amendment being introduced - which in itself, is 
not a remote possibility. Furthermore, if the delegated legislation is approved by 
mid-2017, it is unlikely that the law decrees could be issued before mid-2018 - the 
exact period in which the next general elections are set to take place. 
 
Despite being in the preliminary stages of debate, this proposal is worth close 
consideration. In fact, this call for reform has been justified not only by 
“conventional” reasons, such as: the need to reduce inconsistencies between old and 
more recent provisions; reduce administrative burdens, or streamline judicial 
practice. In the explanatory documents attached to the draft bill, the Italian Ministry 
of Justice had also justified the measure with reference to the urgency of 
implementing a system of best practices and recommendations emerged at the 
international and regional/European level. 
 
With reference to the creditors’ priorities within insolvency law, the technical report 
attached to the draft proposal recognises that the discipline is extremely indented, 
obsolete and antiquated. Both the government (by means of the report of the Ministry 
of Justice) and the members of the Commission have advocated for the need for a 
complete overhaul of the discipline.99 However, the bold call for reform included in 
the technical report is contradicted by the rather limited scope of the amendment 
proposals, which are focused mainly on pledges (or “privilegio retentivo” in Italian) 
and other related institutes, e.g. “patto commissorio”.100 
 
The “Stick”: CJEU Jurisprudence and EU Draft Directive 
 
Up to now the proposal for delegated legislation represents one of the most 
remarkable accomplishments stemming from the EU and international calls for 
reform. However, additional elements may also reinforce the persuasiveness of 
existing recommendations. For instance, at the EU level, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (hereinafter, CJEU) may act as a powerful arrow in the EU’s bow. 
In fact, cross-border cases in the European Union are regulated under the Insolvency 
                                                 
99 C-3671 bis - available at: <http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg17/lavori/stampati/pdf/17PDL0041360.pdf> 
at 17 [last viewed 26 July 2016]. 
100 The “patto commissorio” is an agreement in which the creditor is guaranteed against the non-fulfilment 
of a debt obligation by the collateral security of goods owned by the debtor. Should the debtor fail in its 
(pecuniary) obligation, the creditor would become the sole owner of the mortgaged or pledged good. The 
nullity of such an agreement (and of any agreement which results in similar outcomes) is stated in articles 
1963 and 2744 of the Civil Code. The Rordorf Commission advocated for recognizing the validity of 
these agreements, upon the implementation of certain safeguards. However, back in 2016, the Italian 
legislator eased the limits on the so-called “Martian pact”- a contractual provision named after the classic 
Roman lawyer Martian and substantially similar to the “patto commissorio”. It allows the creditor to seize 
the collateral or force a sale, on the provision that he/she compensated the debtor for any excess value of 
the collateral once the loan is satisfied (art. 2 law no. 119/2016, which determines the transferral of the 
rights in rem on an immovable property when the missed payment of three or more monthly instalments 
lasts for nine months or more).  
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Regulation101 (soon to be replaced by the Recast Regulation)102 with the authority to 
adjudicate cases arising from the application of these legislative instruments held by 
the CJEU.  
 
Under the (modified) universalist approach, which underlies both these legislative 
instruments, cross-border cases are handled within only one jurisdiction (i.e. where 
the centre of main interest of the debtor is located); the lex forum (procedural and 
substantive) is applied to all creditors, irrespective of their nationality. However, 
whenever assets are located in more than one jurisdiction, local creditors may ask to 
open secondary proceedings,103 in which the lex loci forum104 is applied (but only 
with reference to the assets located in that jurisdiction). This strategy is highly 
attractive for local prioritized creditors, where they do not enjoy the same level of 
priority in the COMI MS, provided that there are sufficient unencumbered assets in 
the secondary jurisdiction.105  
 
The Recast Regulation provides some mechanisms to restrict the opening of 
secondary proceedings,106 and one of the pillars of the Treaties is that claimants 
should be treated equally, irrespective of their nationality.107 Accordingly, given the 
opportunity, it is likely the CJEU would dismiss and render inapplicable any national 
law ascribing priority status to national litigants. Indeed, this is precisely what the 
current Italian insolvency law does, since the priority ranking is granted only if the 
artisan is listed in a separate section of the Italian Companies’ House.108 
 
Such a ruling would put additional pressure on the Italian legislator to reform the 
existing rules on creditors’ priority ranking within insolvency legislation.  
 
Another arrow in EU’s bow is the legislative instrument that the Commission is due 
to pass by the end of 2016. Should it be a Directive with the goal of achieving 
minimum standards across MSs’ insolvency laws, such an instrument would fit 
perfectly within the context described above.  
 
In my opinion, the Recital of this legislative instrument should stress the need to 
“remove obstacles in national legislations to the functioning of efficient cross-border 
practices in insolvency law”. Accordingly, the CJEU could appraise whether the 
existing legislation meets the requirements of proportionality, adequacy and 
                                                 
101 Regulation (EU) 1346/2000. 
102 Regulation (EU) 2015/848, which will enter into force in July 2017. 
103 Art. 34 of Regulation (EU) 2015/848. 
104 Art. 35 of Regulation (EU) 2015/848. 
105 Sometimes, courts and IPs of the main proceeding “recognize” priorities of secondary jurisdictions to 
avoid the costs and delays that would occur from them. See Re Collins and Aikman [2006] EWHC 1343. 
106 Art. 38(2) and 36 of Regulation (EU) 2015/848. 
107 This is the so called ‘freedom of establishment’, art. 49 to 52 TFEU.  
108 Art. 5 of Law no. 443/1985. 
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effective judicial protection, as is conceived109 for the purpose of evaluating the 
appropriateness of state responses to breaches of EU law. 
 
If these changes happen in the near future, the reform of these statutory priorities 
within Italian insolvency law, and possibly the systemic harmonization of insolvency 
practice, may become a reality. 
 
“Italian law 2.0” 
 
What would Italian insolvency law look like, if the sticks and the carrot described 
above occur in the near future? 
 
This paper restricts this speculative exercise to the creditors’ ranking in insolvency. 
It starts from the assumption that, whenever beneficiaries are sufficiently restricted 
in number - which is not the case of ‘artisan entrepreneurs’ as described by law no. 
443/1985 - the legislator may have to consider establishing a priority ranking in 
insolvency law. Otherwise alternative mechanisms would need to be considered. 
Any new rule on the subject should omit any reference to national procedural 
requirements for the benefit to be granted, such as the company being listed in a 
special section of the Companies’ House register. Furthermore, it is also necessary 
to come up with a statute that singles out only those highly non-adjusting creditors 
that might be severely affected by the debtor’s lack of repayment. 
 
If the Italian legislator wanted to restrict the priority treatment to those small110 
artisans who find themselves in a situation substantially similar to that of unskilled 
salaried workers, it could rephrase art. 2751 bis (5) of the Civil Code111 as follows: 
 
“Hanno privilegio generale sui mobili i crediti riguardanti: […] (5) i crediti 
dell’artigiano (…) che esercita un’attività professionale con il lavoro 
proprio e dei componenti della famiglia, per i corrispettivi dei servizi prestati 
e della vendita dei manufatti.” 
 
“A general privilege on movable property is granted to credits relating to […] 
claims of an artisan (…) who engages professionally in an activity organized 
mainly with his/her own work and that of the members of their families, for 
the compensation of services rendered and the sale of manufactured 
products.” 
                                                 
109 See EC v Kingdom of the Netherlands (Case C-508/10) [2012] 2 C.M.L.R. 48, where the Court held 
that by levying excessive and disproportionate administrative charges on third-country nationals and their 
family members seeking residence permits under Directive 2003/109, the Netherlands had failed to fulfil 
its obligations under that Directive. See also Sagulo, Brenca and Bakhouche (Case C-8/77) [1977] ECR 
1495, where the Court ruled that, while states were entitled to impose reasonable penalties for 
infringements of administrative requirements governing EU residence permits for migrant workers, the 
penalties must not be disproportionate to the offence in question, and must not constitute an obstacle to 
freedom of movement.  
110 According to the European standards set out in the EU Recommendation 2003/361. 
111 The Rordorf Commission advocated for grouping the insolvency discipline into only one piece of 
legislation, outside the Civil Code. Nevertheless, this provision can easily be accommodated within this 
yet-to-be-drafted bill.  
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This study also demonstrated that, whenever a priority rule is introduced, it should 
be sufficiently flexible to allow both judiciary and practitioners to exercise adequate 
discretion in its implementation. The more detailed the criteria set out in the law, the 
more mechanic its application, the less likely the goal is achieved. 
 
As a result, the Italian legislator may explore the opportunity of introducing in its 
insolvency framework a provision similar to 11 U.S. Code §.105(a), according that: 
 
“L’autorità giudiziaria competente può adottare ogni ordinanza, decreto o 
sentenza che appaia necessario o appropriato per implementare le 
disposizioni [della presente legge].”112 
 
“The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or 
appropriate to carry out the provisions [of this law]”. 
 
Since similar solutions have been enacted in other countries,113 the Italian 
government may explore adopting the same approach with its domestic insolvency 
law. However, this approach to reform presents some shortcomings, which are 
detailed and debated in the following section. 
 
The Limits of the Study, and their Impact on the Recommendations of this 
Article 
 
As it happens with similar empirical studies, this report and its conclusions are open 
to criticism. 
 
A few limitations of the data set should be noted. These include the geographical 
distribution of the cases, and the timeframe of the study. Another characteristic is 
that it is focused only on liquidation cases (“fallimenti”). Reported recovery rate to 
artisans are even lower in alternative rescue procedures, such as pre-bankruptcy 
agreements (“concordato preventivo”),114 given that rescue procedures may not (and 
usually do not) end with a distribution to creditors. More importantly for data-
collection purposes, statistics for these proceedings were not collected on Fall.co or 
on other digital platforms at the time of the study. 
 
                                                 
112 This is the translation in Italian of the English text made by the author of the present note. 
113 Pursuant to Art. 132 (1) of the South Korean Debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act 2005, in a 
rehabilitation procedure, “[w]hen a small- and medium-sized businessman who is a transaction partner 
of the debtor is feared to face hardship in the continuation of his/her business unless he/she receives the 
payment of a small-sum claim that he/she holds, the court may grant permission to pay back the whole or 
part of such small-sum claim to him/her upon receiving an application filed by any custodian, any 
preservative custodian or the debtor even before it decides to authorize a confirmation of a rehabilitation 
plan” - official English translation provided by the South Korean Ministry of Government Legislation. 
Available at: <http://www.moleg.go.kr/english/korLawEng?pstSeq=52645> [last viewed 21 June 2016]. 
114 See ‘Analisi dell’Impatto della Regolamentazione (AIR)’, in a proposal for delegated legislation C-
3671 ter - available at: <http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg17/lavori/stampati/pdf/17PDL0041370.pdf> [last 
viewed 26 July 2017], at 40. 
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Another limit is the size of the sample. Data was gathered for only 1,193 liquidation 
proceedings closed over a period of 18 months, compared to the 14,269 companies 
that filed for liquidation in 2013 alone.115 As such, it represents only a marginal 
portion of the liquidation procedures closed in Italy in the considered timeframe. 
Finally, it was not possible to cross-reference the digital documents uploaded on 
Fall.co with the archived papers.116 Liquidation booklets are archived in separate 
buildings from the main courthouse, sometimes not even in the same city or region. 
Consultation of these documents is therefore highly problematic and time-
consuming. It would also require the constant assistance of a member of the archive, 
during a period in which courthouses are seriously undermanned. 
 
Nevertheless, the lack of cross-referencing should not be as problematic as it seems. 
Many of the documents consulted on Fall.co are computer scans of papers and 
reports signed by the judge responsible for the case. Therefore, it is unlikely that any 
of the official documents uploaded have been replaced without any reference being 
posted on the database. On the other hand, the consultation of paper archives would 
have allowed for data to be gathered on those proceedings where there was no or 
insufficient information was available on Fall.co. 
 
Although some of the attacks are well aimed, on the whole they miss the target, since 
there is no evidence that radically different results could be observed under 
alternative scenarios. 
 
As for the notional conclusions, this paper has already acknowledged the lack of 
theoretical justification for statutory priorities in insolvency law, especially with 
reference to MSMEs. The purpose of this note has been to adopt a pragmatic 
approach to existing problems, rather than theoretically debating the advantages of 
certain solutions over sub-optimal ones. 
 
Furthermore, harmonization practices - and not priority ranking for creditors - were 
the subject of this paper. With regard to that, it might be argued that it is 
methodologically flawed to draw EU-wide conclusions from an analysis of national 
practices. However, it seems to me that, while players and interests may vary from 
country to country, the mechanics of politics are similar throughout the world, not 
simply in Europe. In other words, the onus is on those who disagree with the 
conclusions of this study to demonstrate that any of the alternative solutions 
envisaged by the EU (full harmonization Regulation or an autonomous set of rules) 
would work better in current times and under present circumstances in other MSs. 
- 
                                                 
115 Unfortunately, these figures are no longer provided by the National Institute of Statistics, but only by 
privately-owned companies. See: <https://www.cribis.com/news/fallimenti-in-italia-2013-anno-record-
54-al-giorno-2-ogni-ora/> [last viewed 16 June 2016]. 
116 In accordance with Italian law, paper documents duly signed and notified to all the parties are the only 
ones with legal value. 
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While it may be argued that the results achieved with the 2014 Recommendation are 
relatively minor, significant changes do not happen overnight, and two years is a 
relatively short time in politics. 
 
A policy of implemental and pragmatic changes within national legislations has 
always characterized the EU harmonization process, and has resulted in remarkable 
achievements. Despite its limitations, incremental integration has brought us thus 




This study highlighted some of the fundamental challenges that the European 
legislator faces in its approximation efforts, particularly when the subject of this 
effort is creditors’ ranking in insolvency law. 
 
On the one hand, there are various efficiency arguments advocating for the 
substantive harmonization of insolvency law at EU level, alongside large theoretical 
support for abolishing statutory priorities within insolvency law. While on the other, 
there are opposing considerations (i.e. respect of fundamental, constitutional 
provisions, as well as deference to prevalent domestic business culture) that call for 
the adoption of a more pragmatic approach.  
 
Reforms at national level may be ‘directed’ by the European Commission without 
the need for embracing a top-down and all-encompassing harmonization approach. 
The CJEU could then act as a last resort mechanism, should soft-law 
recommendations and hard-law Directives be ignored. In other words, should the 
carrot prove ineffective, there is always the stick. 
 
As a result, this paper suggests that, in current times, the ‘minimum standard 
approach’ represents the optimal way of proceeding to harmonize insolvency 
practice in the European Union.  
 
  
